The landlocked country of Mali has a long and fascinating history. It was home to several large pre-colonial empires such as the Ghana, Mali and Songhai empires, with Timbuktu in northern Mali being historically known as a centre for trade, culture, knowledge and education. Mali gained independence from France in 1960, with a coup d’etat in 1968 establishing a military dictatorship lasting for 23 years until the country’s first democratic elections that were held in February 1992. The Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali in 2012 was not just a turning point for Mali, but the entirety of West Africa, often being cited as the defining catalyst to the Sahelian insurgency we observe today.

Political profile: A failed poster child for democracy

Following more than two decades of military dictatorship, violent demonstrations in 1991 pressured Colonel Amadou Toumani Traoré to facilitate a democratic transition. A new constitution was adopted that established political pluralism, ushering in a long period of relative stability that transformed Mali into a poster child for African democracy. This stability was interrupted following the collapse of the Gaddafi administration in Libya, with thousands of Tuareg mercenaries returning to northern Mali to launch their own rebellion. President Traoré’s failure to control the rebellion motivated a group of mutinous soldiers to seize power, throwing Mali into political turmoil. The ensuing chaos enabled Tuareg factions in the North to declare the independent state of Azawad. Following a period of political instability in Mali, successive coups in 2020 and 2021 resulted in the establishment of a military junta led by Assimi Goïta. Through a series of constitutional reforms, Goïta consolidated his power in 2025 and is currently serving as Mali’s sixth president.

Security profile: Extremist flames engulf Mali

Since the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, Mali has faced a multifaceted and protracted insurgency. Although initially concentrated in the north, the extremist networks have gradually expanded southwards toward Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) maintain strongholds in rural areas, benefiting from weak governance and limited state presence. ISSP primarily operates in the northeastern Menaka region and the Mali-Burkina-Niger tri-border area near Gao, where it has frequently clashed with JNIM-affiliated factions. JNIM operates widely across Mali, with key factions dominating areas around Kidal and Timbuktu in the north, Gao in the east, as well as Mopti and Ségou in central Mali. JNIM broadened its operations into southern and western Mali throughout 2023, and by September 2025 they had encircled the capital of Bamako, imposing a fuel blockade that had devastating consequences, underscoring its increasing capabilities across the country.

Mali’s security environment has been reshaped by the withdrawal of international forces, with the cessation of the French Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA, the UN’s peacekeeping mission. Mali’s withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025 further reshaped its security environment, undermining wider regional cooperation. These developments have occurred in the context of rising anti-imperialist and anti-French rhetoric, exacerbated by ECOWAS sanctions imposed on Mali after the 2021 military takeover. In response, Mali established a mutual defence agreement known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, as well as seeking a stronger security partnership with Russia.

The country’s military junta, together with Russian mercenary forces, have posed an increasing threat to the country’s population. Their counter-insurgency strategy has resulted in the deaths of a significant number of civilians, an increase from 84 civilian deaths in 2019 to 924 in 2023, even surpassing those caused by extremist groups. Mali’s militarised counterterrorism approach risks creating fertile ground for extremist recruitment, who offer protection to civilians from security forces. Therefore, it is unlikely that this strategy will be sustainable in the long-term elimination of extremist threats in Mali.